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INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGISLATION: IS THE CURE WORSE
THAN THE DISEASE?
GREGORY GELFAND*
It is significant that former Prime Minister Palmer begins his article
with a discussion of the nature of international law, for it is my disa-
greement with him about that nature which dictates the difference in
our approaches to solving global environmental problems. Universal
consent is the essence of international law. Prior to the emergence of
Communist' and Third World countries, international law appeared to
be on the road to a more Austinian nature.2 The emergence of highly
divergent viewpoints, however, precludes such progress, at least for the
foreseeable future.3 Attempts to create the hoped-for "new world or-
* Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law, B.A., 1973, the State
University of New York at Stonybrook; J.D., 1976, the University of Michigan. In
1976, the author served as an Intern in the Office of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat of
the United Nations at the New York headquarters.
1. At this time, there are still some Communist countries. However, whether they
will affect the shaping of international law in the future is unclear. It is also uncertain
whether all of the countries who abandoned communism will remain non-communist.
This Article proceeds on the assumption that communism will probably not continue to
be a force in the international legal arena.
2. See, eg., J. Patrick Kelly, The International Court of Justice: Crises and Refor-
mation, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 342, 343 (1987) (arguing that the International Court of
Justice's compulsory jurisdiction clause was instituted at a time when world leaders
hoped to create a world governed by the rule of law).
3. The recent changes in the Communist World, and some evidence of Third World
maturation force consideration of the optimistic possibility that a time may come when
progress toward a more Austinian international legal system will again be a viable
target.
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der" are premature. The inevitable result of the international legisla-
tion that former Prime Minister Palmer advocates will be the hostile
withdrawal of some world participants as they find the process
unacceptable.
I. THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
As former Prime Minister Palmer notes, there are many who do not
regard international law as "law."4 While he does not concede this
extreme position, Professor Palmer accepts much of the underlying
analysis, and concludes that international law, as it exists today, is too
slow and ineffective to respond to environmental challenges.' Invoking
traditional vertical6 legal positivist notions,7 Professor Palmer argues
that international law must gain the strength of domestic law. In such
analysis, the essence of law is that it has rules as well as identifiable and
authoritative lawmaking bodies.' One can look to these bodies for the
creation of such rules and to officials for proper rule adjudication and
enforcement.
Domestic law fits this model well. -The legislature can pass almost
any law it collectively wishes. Courts are present to adjudicate and
4. Geoffrey Palmer, An International Regime for Environmental Protection, 42
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5, 6 (1992).
5. Id. at 7-8.
6. The term "positivism" is used by legal scholars in two senses. One may be de-
scribed as "vertical" and the other "horizontal." Austin is a positivist in the vertical
sense because he defines law as rules imposed by a legislative or judicial authority upon
those who must obey the law.
Some international lawyers use the term "positive law" as law made by people of
their institutions, in contradistinction to natural law. Positive law, in this sense would
include both vertically imposed law and law made by custom and treaty. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM W. BISHOP, JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 13 (3d ed.
1971).
Custom and treaty, the primary sources of international law, are more horizontal.
They are generated by those who also must obey the law, acting as equals, rather than
any higher authority.
7. See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED
(1832).
8. Palmer, supra note 4, at 7 n.7. Professor Palmer explains that "[J]ohn Austin
and the analytical positivists argued that international law is not law properly so called
because it lacks both a legislature and sanctions." See also Jeffrey L. Harrison & Amy
R. Mashburn, Jean-Luc Godard and Critical Legal Studies (Because We Need the Eggs),
87 MICH. L. REv. 1924, 1924 n.4 (1989) ("By legal positivism we mean the view that
legal outcomes are driven by adherence to objective principles and pre-existing legal
rules.").
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ensure that laws are obeyed. It follows, therefore, that we live in a
crime-free society where everyone abides by contractual obligations,
and nobody ever tortiously injures his or her neighbor. This would be
the case if domestic law were absolutely effective, as its proponents
imply.
In truth, however, Austin is really concerned with the appearance of
law. Domestic law is easy to make, even easier to point to, yet highly
ineffective. Crime continues, and it is doubtful that the criminal law
reduces it. One need only consider the current "war on drugs" to see
the nominal law's impotence. Criminals are difficult to identify; they
hide among society and thwart prosecutorial efforts. In addition, tre-
mendous delays and costs involved in civil litigation handicap that
branch of the law. Only token changes can be found even though
American courts have desegregated the nation, its schools, and its
workplaces for thirty-five years.9
Former Prime Minister Palmer laments the weakness of interna-
tional law: He explains that "[t]he decision to do anything about
breaches of international law will not usually depend on the fact of the
breach."' Is the "fact of the breach" any more the sine qua non of
retribution or compensation under the domestic law? Can anyone
doubt, for example, that our neighborhoods are still segregated? Do-
mestic lawyers judge law by its appearance. International law is more
amorphously created and has less formal enforcement facilities. As a
result, international law fails to measure up to domestic standards.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appearance of law
is the measure of law, the critical legal studies movement is not so im-
pressed with domestic law. Nothing is clear on its face, and interpreta-
tion is not a "legal" process. 1 The choice of interpretation is political.
As several first year law students say to me every year, "[t]he statute
means what the court wants it to mean," or, "[t]he court just does what
it wants to do, and then dresses it up with the explanation." In fact,
there are paradigms of legislative interpretation (and of common law
analysis for non-statutory questions) that exert some force on judges.
9. See, e.g., Finis Welch & Audrey Light, New Evidence on School Desegregation
(U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights 1987).
10. Palmer, supra note 4, at 8.
11. See, e.g., Harrison & Mashburn, supra note 8, at 1924; Joseph Singer, The
Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legat Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984) (explaining
the failures of traditional legal theories). But see Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Func-
tion and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 837, 838- 49
(explaining external pressures felt by judges interpreting law and making decisions).
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The "crits" overstate their point. It would be the more naive option,
however, to believe that the paradigms of legal analysis vel non govern
all - or even most - decisions.
Having a written law does not guarantee courts' adherence. The
Fourteenth Amendment 2 was almost a hundred years old before
Brown v. Board of Education.13 The Establishment Clause 4 seems to
have first awakened from its slumber in 1962." The clause seems to be
returning to oblivion at the moment, as the Court allows legislative
prayer, 16 Christmas displays,17 and is currently considering public
school prayer at graduation ceremonies. 8 In the not-too-distant past,
the Free Exercise Clause was given sporadic life' 9 after years of disre-
gard. Most recently, however, the Court has held the Clause to be
virtually meaningless.20
Even in the domestic law context, rights which exist "on paper"
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion ... ").
15. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-37 (1962) (mandatory public school class-
room prayer violates the Establishment Clause); see also School Dist. of Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (enjoining public school class room Bible reading).
16. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793-94 (1983) (upholding the constitutional-
ity of the Nebraska legislature's practice of opening each session with a prayer by a
chaplain paid with public funds).
17. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) (holding that a city inclusion of a
nativity scene in a Christmas display did not violate the Establishment Clause).
18. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305
(1991).
19. For typical examples of older decisions giving little or no weight to the Free
Exercise Clause, see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944); Romney v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1889); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). For
typical examples of more recent decisions, see Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
20. See Oregon Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In
Smith, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not prevent the application of
Oregon's drug use laws to the ceremonial use of peyote by native Americans. In so
holding, however, the Court dramatically altered all of its previous Free Exercise
Clause analysis. Rather than basing the decision on a special or vital need to stop drug
use, the Court simply eliminated Free Exercise protection from any law which is neutral
on its face. After Smith, only a law which prohibits a religious practice and names that
practice as a religious practice would violate the Clause. For example, Smith's analysis
would still find a law which says, "It shall be a felony to hold a Catholic Mass in this
state," to be a violation of the Clause. It is difficult to imagine anything less extreme
which would violate the Clause, however, after Smith.
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have no power over the courts if the society is not ready and willing to
embrace them.2 1 Leaving aside the fact that courts would not really be
able to enforce laws, it is also obvious that having a clear, Austinian
source of law (like the Constitution) does not even mean that courts
will be bound by its plain language. There is no panacea in having
Austinian law.2 2
International law has its primary source in the practice of nations.23
As a result, international law is conceptually empirical. It has little to
do with the appearance of law. If domestic law was described in terms
of results, the following would describe the sanctity of contracts:
If the amount of money involved is less than necessary to justify
the cost of litigation, contracts are unenforceable. If the amount
justifies the cost of litigation, the victim of the breach is likely to
settle for only a small fraction of his expectations under the con-
tract in order to avoid having to pay the full cost of litigation and
to avoid undue delay. Accordingly, it usually pays to breach con-
tracts if a deal becomes significantly undesirable.
If we stated domestic law with such candor, there might be calls for
ways to strengthen domestic law by making it more like international
law.
Former Prime Minister Palmer acknowledges the formation of inter-
national law from the practice of nations, but he expresses doubt that it
is as effective as domestic law, saying, "[lt is not so easy, however, to
develop a coherent theory as to why those rules are binding."24 The
fact that enforcing agents which make international law binding are
not Austinian does not mean that they do not exist. Indeed, although
21. See LARRY BARNETr & EMILY REED, LAW, SOCIETY AND POPULATION: IS-
SUES IN A NEW FIELD (1985). Almost everyone in America pays lip service to integra-
tion and freedom of religion, but the sad reality of our society is that "integration"
means "integrate the neighborhood I don't live in," and "freedom of religion" means
"my freedom to make you accept my religion." See id. at 120-213. The authors present
charts drawn from survey responses showing that most of the United States population
supports Brown v. Board of Education in the abstract. White parents did not generally
object to "a few" black children attending their children's schools. However, a majority
of the parents objected when asked about their children attending schools "half or more
than half" black.
22. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text exploring the need for more than
simply creating "law on the books."
23. See, e.g., Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (explaining that mutual
conduct is the primary source of environmental law); BISHOP, supra note 6, at 3-6; G.
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1940).
24. Palmer, supra note 4, at 7.
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it would be difficult to quantify and compare objectively, international
law is almost certainly by far the more binding of the two.
Unlike individuals, nations cannot hide. The nations of the world
are a much smaller and more interdependent group than the domestic
population. A thief can break the law and hide; a businessman can
break a contract and find other business contacts. The nations of the
world are inextricably linked to one another. It is not possible to find
another set of nations to do business with. For example, many Third
World countries who expropriated the property of foreign investors a
generation ago, and questioned the duty to compensate, are now find-
ing it very difficult to attract investment.25
II. MAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW MORE AUSTINIAN
Former Prime Minister Palmer sees three shortcomings of interna-
tional law which he fears will render it unable to cope with the coming
environmental crisis.26 First, international law lacks true legislative
capacity. Since making international law by the practice of nations or
by multilateral treaty requires the consent or acquiescence of every rel-
evant nation, the process is too slow and cumbersome. A single signifi-
cant nation can bring it to a halt. Prime Minister Palmer advocates a
true legislative body which would use the will of the majority to bind
nations that vote in the negative.27 Second, international law is said to
lack means of having compulsory adjudication. 2 Third, the interna-
tional community needs an investigatory prosecutor to make the adju-
dication effective.29
I have previously discussed the fact that the lack of courts does not
mean that international law lacks enforcement mechanisms. There ex-
ists a more subtle form through which the nations of the world can
voice displeasure. Diplomatic protests initiate a process that could
proceed to the level of sanctions or even the use of force, as in Kuwait.
If a violator refuses to bend to the international will, the violator's dip-
lomatic objections are disregarded. The entire process is far too varied
and interactive to detail here, yet it clearly works.3 ° Nations know that
25. Further, international sanctions have brought the Union of South Africa's white
government to the brink of dissolution.
26. Palmer, supra note 4, at 16-17.
27. Id. at 14-15.
28. Id. at 11
29. Id. at 12
30. For some truly excellent insights into the nature of this process, see generally
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they will pay a price for violating international law.
As Former Prime Minister Palmer points out, however, much can be
learned from the failure to date of the International Court of Justice."1
The Court is only effective against states that violate international law
if the Court has compulsory jurisdiction. Mr. Palmer discusses the
United States' withdrawal of its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction
as a result of its controversy with Nicaragua in 1988, and the similar
withdrawal of France resulting from the Nuclear Test Case of 1974.32
Less than a third of the members of the United Nations currently ac-
cept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. Further, that number is not
a sign of slow progress toward universal membership. In the earliest
days of the United Nations, the relative number of such states was ris-
ing, but it reached a high point in 1953, 33 with a slight majority of the
United Nations members accepting compulsory jurisdiction.34 Even
then, many of these acceptances were illusory.35 Since that time, there
has been a relatively steady drop in acceptance.3 6
Greater concern lies in the five permanent members of the Security
ANTHONY D'AMATo, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCE S AND PROSPECT (1987). See
also Louis HENKEN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) ("[A]limost all nations
observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations
almost all of the time.") (emphasis omitted).
31. Palmer, supra note 4, at 11-12.
32. Id. See also Kelly, supra note 2, at 344-48. Professor Kelly also details the
similarly disappointing experience of The Permanent Court of International Justice (ad-
junct to the League of Nations) during its brief period of existence. Id. at 344-46.
33. Kelly, supra note 2, at 348. The actual number of states accepting the Court's
jurisdiction has risen slightly because of the vast increase in nations in the world in
recent years, but the relative number has dropped precipitously.
34. Id. at 348. In 1934, the Permanent Court of International Justice had 70 per-
cent of the membership of the League of Nations accepting its jurisdiction. Id.
35. Id. at 351-61 (summarizing the growing practice of placing limitations and con-
ditions as a country's acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction clause).
36. Id. at 349. Further, as Professor Kelly points out in a subsequent article:
One further dose of realism is in order. Respondents in the last eight contentious
cases, not based on a voluntary special agreement, have chosen either not to appear
at some stage of the proceedings or not to comply. This is not to say that interna-
tional adjudication is not a valuable dispute resolution technique. It has frequently
been successful on an ad hoc voluntary basis under article 36(1) of the Court's
statute. The United States government has referred several such disputes to the
Court in recent years. Rather, compulsory jurisdiction has not worked in practice;
indeed it has never been tried.
J. Patrick Kelly, The Changing Process of International Law and The Role of the World
Court, I 1 MICH. J. INT'L L. 129, 142 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
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Council.37 In 1953, only the Soviet Union refused to accept the
Court's jurisdiction. 8 Professor Palmer points out that today, Great
Britain is the only permanent member of the Security Council that still
participates.39 Actually, it would be fairer to delete Britain from the
list as well because its acceptance has been illusory since 1955. Profes-
sor Patrick Kelly presents the following well-stated account:
The United Kingdom has developed a technique nearly as useful
as termination for avoiding adjudication that it perceives to
threaten its interests. It terminates its declaration and substitutes
a new one excluding the specific matter in dispute. In October
1955, the United Kingdom terminated a declaration made only
five months previously in order to include a new reservation. This
reservation was carefully designed to exclude consideration of the
Burami dispute with Saudi Arabia. In 1957, the United Kingdom
again terminated its declaration in order to add a self-judging res-
ervation concerning national security. This reservation had the
effect of insulating its nuclear weapons testing program from
challenge.4
Rather than lamenting each nation's withdrawal as an isolated sad day
in the development of international law, Professor Kelly argues that
the steady stream of withdrawals points to a more profound flaw in the
very concept of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
The Court is not suited to the nature of international law for a
number of reasons: first, because so-called zero-sum proceedings -
where "winners" and, therefore, corresponding "losers" must be iden-
tified - actually interfere with dispute resolution; second, fundamental
disagreements exist among nations about governing principles of inter-
national law and, most recently, about the process of creating interna-
tional law.41 Professor Kelly persuasively argues that recent attempts
by the Court to give General Assembly resolutions greater significance
can only insure that acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International
Court will decrease even further.42 Although conceived with the best
37. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 349.
38. Id. at 348.
39. Palmer, supra note 4, at 11.
40. Kelly, supra note 2, at 350 (footnotes omitted).
41. See generally Kelly, supra note 36; BISHOP, supra note 6, at 20-25.
42. Kelly, supra note 36, at 155 ("The Court's process innovation [including Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions as a source of law] clarifies that the exposure of the United
States to decisions of the World Court adverse to its conceptions of international law
has become far wider than any reservations can cloak.").
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of intentions, the presence of the International Court of Justice's com-
pulsory jurisdiction continually impedes the growth and enforcement
of international law.
At the heart of Professor Palmer's international regime for environ-
mental law is a proposal for a true legislative body. All nations must
participate, or at least acquiesce, in the process of making law through
custom or "practice of law."43 Treaties, of course, require actual con-
sent through ratification. Legislation, on the other hand, proceeds by
vote." It is expected that some number of negative votes will be over-
ruled. Indeed, this is the virtue that Mr. Palmer seeks to achieve be-
cause it makes law easier to create.
Mr. Palmer overstates the difficulty of obtaining unanimous consent
(or acquiescence) in the international arena. In a comment directed to
treaty-making, but no doubt equally applicable to custom and practice,
he laments, "[t]here is no obligation on any state to became a party to a
particular treaty. That is the first difficulty. ' 45 This assertion over-
looks the role of interdependence in international law. A nation cannot
unilaterally ignore the desires of the international community. For ex-
ample, a country cannot emit transboundary pollution or accelerate the
depletion of the ozone layer, without becoming an international outcast
as South Africa has for the treatment of its Black majority.
Dynamic tension produces fairness in international law. If the inter-
national community asks a country to do more than it can possibly
accept, each nation has the ability to dare to incur the costs of being an
outcast. This forces compromise and mediation. Over the years, the
process has proved itself.
It would be dangerous to set the precedent of international legisla-
tion at this time. The existing lack of consensus as to the appropriate
content of international law as well as the diverging views of Western
and Third World nations. While the European community may hope
for multinational legislation, for example, the European community is
43. See, eg., Kelly, supra note 36, at 143 n.89; MacGibbon, The Scope of Acquies-
cence in International Law, 1954 BArr. Y.B. INT'L. L. 143.
44. The number of votes required to pass legislation need not be a simple majority.
Greater or lesser weight may be given to the votes of different categories of nations.
Former Prime Minister Palmer's example from the Montreal Protocol demonstrates
this. See Palmer, supra note 4, at 15. Also, the Security Counsel veto is an example of
this. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, § 3 (also requiring a vote of nine out of fifteen, higher than
a simple majority).
45. Palmer, supra note 4, at 11.
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a fairly homogeneous group. 46
Although I am certain many will criticize my view,47 I believe that
many Third World nations have acted with great immaturity in inter-
national matters, and I deeply fear trusting their automatic voting ma-
jority with important questions. From my own experience at the
United Nations, I found that some Third World nations openly boast
of their enjoyment when harassing the United States without regard to
the merits of the underlying controversy. With exceptions of course,
some of these countries often act out of extremely short-term political
convenience. A notable example is the recent flip-flop over Israel's al-
leged "racism."48
Professor Palmer describes all of the nations of the world as "co-
equal sovereign states."'49 One can certainly debate whether a nation
the size of Lebanon is co-equal to the United States. The obvious dif-
ferences in nations may cause the "one nation - one vote" system to
have unrepresentative consequences. In any event, that equality, if it
be conceded, does not imply the trust or respect which would justify a
grant of legislative power. That trust must be earned.
Thus, while Prime Minister Palmer commends Article 9(c)(2) of the
Montreal Protocol,5" and efforts to strengthen the United Nations,51 I
believe that these are unwise precedents. I doubt if the United Nations
would have survived any five-year period of its existence without the
46. See, e.g., Michael S. Feeley & Peter M. Gilhuly, Green Law-Making: A Primer
on the European Community's Environmental Legislative Process, 24 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 653 (1991) (examining the European community's background and environ-
mental legislative regime).
47. See generally Kelly, supra note 36 (portraying Third World views as equally
legitimate to traditional views).
48. See John M. Goshko, U.N. Repeals Resolution Linking Zionism to Racism,
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 17, 1991, at Al. This incident is even more troubling to me.
At a time when Israel was still considered "racist," I had a conversation with a second-
level member of the United Nations delegation from an African nation. I would not
relate this story if I did not feel it was representative of the Third World views I encoun-
tered. I asked why it was racist for Israel to create a Jewish state, and not racist for
another country to create an Islamic state. Sixteen years later, I can still recall his
reply: "They are Jews. The world doesn't need Jews." Apparently, he did not realize
that I was Jewish. I am not prepared to entrust international legislative power to such
persons.
49. Palmer, supra note 4, at 8.
50. Id. at 14-15.
51. Id. at 17-18.
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saving grace of the five permanent members of the Security Council's
veto power.
Ironically, whenever it suits the United States' short-term conven-
ience, the United States has sought to strengthen the United Nations
because it appeals to American notions of a world governed by law and
order. This tradition began in 1950 when the United States, temporar-
ily assured of an automatic anti-Communist voting majority in the
General Assembly, sought to give the General Assembly power to cir-
cumvent the Soviet Union's Security Council veto through the "Unit-
ing for Peace" resolution.52 Subsequently, the admission of a vast
number of Third World countries to the General Assembly has meant
that the United States now uses the veto as often as Soviet
Union/Russia.53 The United States has come to regret the Uniting for
Peace resolution. Notably, Judge Bedjaoui of the International Court
has pointed out that the Western nations who now so strenuously op-
pose giving the General Assembly law-creating powers are the very
nations that initiated the transfer of power from the blocked Security
Council to the General Assembly in the Uniting for Peace resolution.54
Former Prime Minister Palmer states, "[p]olitical decision makers
dwell little on theory and even less on jurisprudence. They want some-
thing practical that works." 55 The statement is all too true, but I, at
least, hope for more. Political decision makers must begin to think of
the long-term consequences of their actions. Concerns about the bio-
sphere, however vital, should not replace long-term concern about con-
sequences for the system of international relations. In protecting
ourselves from global warming as former Prime Minister Palmer sug-
gests, we may sow the seeds of the destruction of international protec-
tion of human rights, the seeds of increasing terrorism, or possibly even
the seeds of war. I find these prices far too high.
Much has been made of President Bush's "new world order." I find
it interesting that President Bush built up the United Nations' legiti-
macy and, in the process, sacrificed control over the Kuwait operation
52. G. A. Reso. 377(V) of 3 November 1950. G.A.O.R. V plenary 347. See gener-
ally Louis SOHN, CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW 491-509 (2d ed. 1967) (discussing
the United for Peace resolution).
53. See, eg., Kelly, supra note 36, at 147-48 n.116 ("The Security Council voted 11
to 1 (U.S. against) for a resolution condemning the intervention in Grenada as a flagrant
violation of international law ... ").
54. MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC OR-
DER 178 (1979).
55. Palmer, supra note 4, at 9.
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for a small amount of political imagery. As a result of international
pressure, the advance halted once Kuwait was liberated leaving Sad-
dam Hussein still in power. I fear that the rest of the United Nations
may start to expect their assent to be required in the future before the
United States can defend a friendly nation.
III. THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
Environmental problems clearly do traverse national borders. Dam-
age to the ozone layer threatens the world at large, rather than any
particular country. Yet the history of international cooperation re-
garding ozone layer protection has been quite commendable. The 1990
Montreal Protocol amendments require the complete phasing out of all
ozone depleting substances by the year 2000.56 This is the result of the
multilateral treaty process in action. Further, new scientific evidence
indicates that even the year 2000 may not be soon enough. Accord-
ingly, since Professor Palmer spoke, the United States has taken unilat-
eral action going beyond the treaty through domestic legislation.57
Yet, one must concede that the ozone layer problem may be easier to
solve than other governmental problems, such as the greenhouse effect,
acid rain, hazardous waste, and the environment in space. At the same
time, unlike ozone depletion, these problems do not require a solution
in such an extremely short time period. The international community,
however, has made some progress.
For example, in June of 1992 a worldwide Conference on the Envi-
ronment and Development will take place. Ambassador Elliot Rich-
ardson has written a persuasive article describing the magnitude of the
conference and describing potential approaches.5" Not all solutions
will come on such a grand scale. To reduce global warming and acid
rain, we must look to the tremendous power of the wind and the tides.
Notwithstanding common public perceptions to the contrary, wind and
tidal power could easily satisfy all of our electricity needs. The real
56. Palmer, supra note 4, at 14.
57. See Philip J. Hilts, Senate Backs Faster Protection of Ozone Layer as Bush Re-
lents, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1992, at Al. See also Ved P. Nanda, Global Warming and
International Environmental Law - A Preliminary Inquiry, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 375,
390 n.99 (1989) ("The United States took the lead in banning the use of CFCs in
aerosols.").
58. See Elliot Richardson, Prospects for the 1992 Conference on the Environment
and Development: A New World Order, 25 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (1991). In a
manner quite similar to the series of articles presented here, Ambassador Richardson's
article is followed by three articles responding to it. Id. at 13-36.
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difficulty is overcoming the tyranny of engineers who prefer to build
nuclear power plants.59 I would certainly not look forward to a world
where underdeveloped nations are using nuclear power on a large
scale. Money-saving corner cutting will mean that virtually all of the
Third World reactors will provide their own environmental risks on a
scale far greater than global warming. Also, wherever nuclear power
plant technology goes, nuclear weapons technology goes.
Acid rain is being attacked with considerable success. Our neighbor,
Canada, and our own northeastern states have pressured the federal
government, and much has been done through domestic legislation in
the United States.' This model is promising, and might be used else-
where in the world. Professor Nanda argues that the Basel Conven-
tion is a good start in the area of international hazardous waste
export.6 ' He identifies the weaknesses that will be subjected to interna-
tional scrutiny at the 1992 conference. Further, Professor Nanda de-
tails the laudable efforts of the World Bank to use its huge development
lending fund as a "carrot" to encourage environmentally sound plan-
ning.62 The similar use of other international administrative agencies
has begun, and is likely to increase.63 Nations have also achieved con-
siderable success in protecting the environment (or lack thereof) in
space from radioactive materials."
59. See, eg., Amory Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?, 55 FOREIGN
AFF. 65 (Oct. 1979).
60. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 1991).
61. See Ved P. Nanda, International Environmental Protection and Developing
Countries' Interests: The Role of International Law, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 497, 507-11
(1991) (discussing international environmental issues). See also Alexandre Kiss, The
International Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, 26 TEx. INT'L
L.J. 521 (1991) (examining how international legal entities have responded to trans-
boundry movement of hazardous waste); Ved P. Nanda & Bruce C. Bailey, Export of
Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Technology: Challenge For International Environ-
mental Law, 17 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 155 (1988) (exploring necessary considera-
tions in addressing international hazardous waste problems).
62. Id. at 190-92. The "stick" model would make certain acts illegal in order to
encourage environmentally sound planning.
63. See Symposium: International Development Agencies (IDAs), Human Rights
and Environmental Considerations, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & PoL'y 29-154 (1988).
64. See, eg., Note, Regulation of the Outer Space Environment Through Interna-
tionalAccord: The 1979 Moon Treaty, 2 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 173 (1991); Harold
C. Manson, The Impact of International Outer Space Commerce on the Environment, 26
TEX. INT'L L.J. 541 (1991) (examining potential environmental effects of international
space commerce). Overpopulation is also an additional area of global environmental
concern. Political and religious tensions may pose a profound obstacle to work in that
area, yet some action will become absolutely necessary in the coming century.
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IV. SOLUTIONS
Traditional international law holds a nation liable for monetary
damages caused by pollution generated from within its territory.6"
Doctrines related to monetary liability, however, have shown little pro-
gress since Professor Goldie's seminal work on the topic in 1965.66 No
one is interested in receiving "compensation" for the loss of the ozone
layer. No one knows how to measure such damage, and how to prove
causation.67 More importantly, we wish to save the environment and
do not desire payment for its loss. 68 One can certainly debate whether
monetary damages work to deter wrongful or dangerous conduct in the
domestic context.69 In the international context, however, it is difficult
to imagine that any deterrent effect would be felt at all.
One mechanism that is likely to help is unilateral legislation. Do-
mestic and international pressure may help to initiate such legislation.
We are all citizens of the world, and every step that minimizes environ-
mental harms helps all of us. This option can prove to be quietly effec-
tive even though it lacks the international drama of treaties. Certainly,
the United States has made great progress towards controlling acid
rain and the ozone in this manner.
Another mechanism to combat global warming is currently in use by
private, non-governmental organizations such as the Nature Conser-
vancy.7 ° These organizations purchase tropical rain forest land.7"
65. See Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 Rep. Int'l. Arb.
Awards (1905), reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684, 716 (1941). Cf. Corfu Channel
Case, (U.K. v. Albania) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 ("[E]very state [has an] obligation not to allow
knowingly [sic] its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states.").
66. L. F. E. Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of Inter-
national Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1189 (1965) (discussing liability theories in inter-
national law).
67. See Nanda, supra note 57, at 382-84 (advocating a new approach to global
warming based on cooperation, rather than liability).
68. Professor Nanda explains that "[n]o amount of money will allow a nation to
purchase a more favorable weather pattern, a cooler climate, or adequate rainfall." Id.
at 384.
69. In the area of medical malpractice, for example, there is some evidence that fear
of malpractice actions does improve medical care. See BARRY FURROW ET AL.,
HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 163-64 (2d ed. 1991). However,
the factors which are likely to account for the positive effect of malpractice litigation
such as direct personal fear of financial loss combined with present ability to avoid
liability by changing conduct, are not present in the international environmental
context.
70. See TIME, Feb. 3, 1992, at 59 (advertisement). But see Priya AIagiri, Comment,
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This can be achieved by outright purchase or, in the case of Third
World countries, by the so-called "debt-for-nature swap" technique.
There is no reason why only private groups can participate. The na-
tions in the Group of Seven could get together and buy tropical
rainforest land to protect it from development.
A third technique, somewhat of an inverse corollary of the debt-for-
nature swap, is the use of World Bank development loans. The loans
are used as incentives, making loans only for environmentally sound
projects, and only to countries that take other specific steps to protect
the environment.
A fourth technique for dealing with the various environmental
problems is through multilateral treaties. Although one cannot force a
nation to sign such a treaty, the international pressure to do so is signif-
icant. Even in cases where such treaties constitute a significant re-
straint on a nation's freedom of choice, multilateral treaties have been
substantially successful in tackling environmental problems. These
treaties often include not only nation-states, but also non-governmental
international bodies such as UNEP (the United Nations Environment
Programme) and WMO (the World Meteorological Organization).
Hahn and Richards make an excellent case that such multilateral trea-
ties are the best bet for future programs.72 They demonstrate a clear
trend in the growing use of such treaties for environmental concerns
and explain that the increase is due to scientific macro-psychological,
economic, and political factors.73 Since 1989, multilateral amend-
ments74 have dramatically strengthened the Montreal Protocol on the
ozone layer. This further demonstrates Hahn and Richard's thesis.
The 1992 Conference in Brazil is likely to further demonstrate this
Give Us Sovereignty or Give Us Debt: Debtor Countries' Perspective on Debt-for-Nature
Swaps, 41 AM. U.L. REv. 485 (1992).
71. The ultimate fear, however, is that Third World nations might ultimately expro-
priate such lands and turn them to "productive" use. Bilateral international treaties
could help to reduce this possibility, but it is unwise to invest too heavily without some
reason to believe that purchased nature preserves will not be expropriated.
72. Robert W. Hahn & Kenneth R. Richards, The Internationalization of Environ-
mental Regulation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421 (1989) (constructing a framework for un-
derstanding international environmental agreements and discussing implications for
national policy).
73. Id. at 424-25. A chart which strongly demonstrates an upward trend in the use
of treaties for environmental purposes appears at 425.
74. See Palmer, supra note 4, at 14 (describing the 1990 Montreal Protocol
amendments).
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although that Conference will be more of a catalyst than a formal
treaty session.
A fifth strategy - which must be used along with, and as a part of
the other strategies - is to keep international attention focused on vi-
tal environmental questions. This symposium and Former Prime Min-
ister Palmer's original speech play a role in this process. Of course, the
1992 Conference will play a greater role than our efforts. Also, Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions, so-called "soft" law or "aspirational" law
in the form of declarations and treaties which create no formal obliga-
tions, serve this purpose. Professor Palmer and I are of one mind on
this point.75 Having a "hard" law treaty on the books is no substitute
for political awareness and vigilance in either the international or do-
mestic arena.
Recent international experience shows that "law on the books" is no
substitute for continuing vigilance. For example, Japan, under consid-
erable pressure from other nations, became party to the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.7 6 Philippe Sands has de-
tailed some of the recent history of Japanese performance under the
Whaling Convention:
Even when the offending state is a party to an appropriate con-
vention, there is no guarantee that action will be taken...
Article VIII of the Convention provides that notwithstanding
any provisions in the Schedule, including established quotas or
moratoria, the contracting parties may grant to their nationals a
permit authorizing the taking or killing of whales for purposes of
"scientific research." The specific conditions to be imposed for
such permits are left to the contracting government, which is re-
quired only to report to the Whaling Commission that a permit
has been granted, and to transmit periodically the results of the
scientific research carried out. The Convention contains no defini-
tion of the term "scientific research." While the Commission's
Scientific Committee is empowered to review and comment upon
proposed scientific permits, and to submit recommendations and
reports to the full Commission, the Convention fails to endow any
such recommendations with binding force.
75. Id. at 14. ("Do not denigrate soft law in the international environmental area -
it has its uses."). Professor Palmer shows this through the example of how the Helsinki
Declaration of 1989 became the 1990 London amendments to the Montreal Protocol.
The London amendments, galvanized by the Helsinki Declaration, require the complete
phase out of all ozone depleting chemicals by the year 2000. Id.
76. Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716; T.I.A.S. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (entered into force
Nov. 10, 1948).
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In 1987, Japan submitted a "scientific research proposal" to the
Whaling Commission which called for the taking of 825 minke
and 50 sperm whales over a ten-year period. The purpose of the
purported "research" was to determine the number of "surplus"
whales in order to assess whether the resource could be utilized
through resumed commercial whaling. The proposal would re-
quire the killing of the whales taken and the "scientific research"
was to be financed by the sale of the whale meat.
In June 1987, the Commission's Scientific Committee reviewed
the Japanese proposal but failed to reach a consensus on the ques-
tion of whether Japan's proposed activity constituted "scientific
research." However, the Commission voted down the proposal
and issued a non-binding recommendation that the "research"
should not proceed. Despite the Commission finding that the sci-
entific nature of the research was questionable, Japanese officials
announced that the recommendation was not binding and that
permits would be granted.
Under the threat of U.S. sanctions, inspired partly by pressure
from non-governmental organizations, Japan returned to the
Commission with a scaled-back Feasibility Plan, which called for
a reduced hunt of 300 minkes during the 1987 season. By the time
the Commission rejected the "research" proposal as lacking scien-
tific validity, Japan had granted permits, ships had sailed and
whales had been taken. Japan has continued to exploit the "scien-
tific research" loophole of Article VIII. On December 17, 1988,
Japanese ships set sail for the Antarctic, under the guise of con-
ducting an additional feasibility study, which called for the taking
of another 300 minke whales."
Although it is arguable that the only problem here is the lack of a
good enforcement mechanism,7" Professor Kelly's analysis of the
World Court as a zero-sum dispute resolution mechanism suggests
otherwise. Without vigilance by other nations and groups, Japan
would simply ignore sanctions, withdraw from the convention, or place
reservations that would make its signature illusory. Legislation, inter-
national or domestic, as well as treaties are too facile to solve the global
environmental problems that we face today. There is simply no one-
shot action we can take that will solve such problems. Only constant
vigilance will succeed. Treaties and other formal acts are steps in the
process of vigilance, not substitutes for it.
77. Philippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community, and International Law, 30
HARV. INT'L L.J. 393, 409-11 n.76 (1989) (citations omitted).
78. Philippe Sands draws this conclusion. Id. at 409-12.
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CONCLUSION
The strength of international law is too often underrated, while the
strength of domestic law is conversely overrated. Our naive attraction
to Austinian mechanisms is to blame. Austinian analysis focuses on
the appearance rather than the reality of law. International law takes
its strength from the interdependence of the family of nations. As a
result, international law is undoubtedly more effective than domestic
law, despite domestic law's more concrete appearance.
In the international context, the premature introduction of Aus-
tinian mechanisms, such as true legislative bodies, is likely to have two
effects. First, such mechanisms will prove ineffective. "Laws" made
without universal consent will not be followed if they are unacceptable
to certain nations. Second, and perhaps more importantly, negative
reactions by nations to the legislative process itself are likely to under-
mine the regime of international law.
International law is probably approaching a crucial crossroad in its
development. The difficulty in finding agreement on either the content
or lawmaking processes of international law, which is the product of
the post-World War II emergence of the Communist countries and the
Third World countries, may be about to resolve itself. I do not share
without qualification the common assumption that Communism is
dead. It is still possible for certain negative events to revive our cold
war problems to an uncertain extent. This most likely will not occur.
Further, if the modest trend among Third World nations towards
greater stability and maturity continues, international law could be in a
position to become more Austinian in nature within, perhaps, a genera-
tion. We are not at that point now, and Austinian development is best
left for homogeneous groups of nations like the European Community.
A premature lunge into a world-wide legislative procedure could pro-
duce disastrous results and destroy the process at a time when it is
moving towards readiness for such Austinian mechanisms.
If the time comes when the international community is ready for
such Austinian institutions as a judiciary with compulsory jurisdiction
and one or more true legislative bodies, these institutions would be wel-
come improvements to the regime of international law. They would
work in addition to, rather than in place of, the vital factor of interde-
pendence. Therefore, the danger is not the Austinian institutions per
se, but rather their premature introduction.
In the meantime, existing mechanisms are much more viable than
former Prime Minister Palmer admits. A mixture of unilateral legisla-
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tion, international administrative action, private or public debt-for-na-
ture exchanges and, undoubtedly most important, multilateral treaties
appear to be working well. With greater efforts, these tools will be
sufficient to meet the challenge of saving our world environment.
However, the key factor is vigilance. Legislation, treaties, and judicial
enforcement are not the sine qua non of success. If the international
community allows the world environment to slip from the political
forefront, no combination of Austinian and non-Austinian rules and
institutions can succeed.
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